THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF VALUES

John McMurtry
Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph NIG 2W1, Canada

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Summary

This chapter provides an overview value-system analysis of how we live and reason, explaining the unexamined presuppositions which govern science, technology and social orders themselves, and why humanity’s unique choice-space of deciding the rules of its reproduction has long been blinkered out. Throughout this axiological investigation lays bare the ultimate but unseen normative crisis of the contemporary epoch - money versus life sequences of value - and explains how this ultimate conflict of value-sets determines humanity’s future beneath system-wide avoidance of the problem.

1.1. Value Pervasion without Core

Despite an increasingly dominant view among philosophers and social scientists that no values can be universalized to have reliable status beyond particular locations, people's
lives everywhere are no less pervasively determined by them. The value-laden reality of our condition is graphically described by John Fekete in *Life after Postmodernism: Essays on Culture and Values* (1987): “[W]e live, breathe, and excrete values. No aspect of human life is unrelated to values, valuations, and validations. Value orientations and value relations saturate our experiences and life practices from the smallest established microstructures of feeling, thought, and behavior to the largest established macrostructures of organizations and institutions. The history of cultures and social formations is unintelligible except in relation to a history of value orientations, value ideals, goods values, value responses, and value judgments, and their objectifications, interplay, and transformations” (p.1).

1.1.1. The Postmodern and Cosmopolitan View of Values

The postmodern and cosmopolitan view is that there is no global or universal value across cultural codes and individual perspectives, or even the true meaning of a text. This is a philosophy of “differences” without common ground or foundation which has become conventional wisdom in the last 30 years.

Yet at the same time, political conflict across the globe features universal value claims in the name of which elections, wars, persecutions and propaganda campaigns are fought - “Western values”, “Islamic values”, “family values”, and even “life values” that are indifferent to the bearers of life.

1.1.2. Values Lead as Well As Rationalize

In the last century especially, political and propagandist exploitations of the centrality of values in people’s lives have given the concept of “values” such a bad name that many have repudiated values discourse altogether as “merely ideological”. Such dismissal is dangerous because it does not engage a profound problem of the human condition - values that not only rationalize, for example, wars and persecutions, but lead them by canalizing their motivation as good in nature. If the claim of good stays critically unexamined (whether by evangelical certitude, cosmopolitan cynicism, or mechanical reduction to self-interest), it avoids detection as a fallacious moral construction.

1.1.3. Calling Values to Account

When former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, argues in a New Year edition of *Foreign Affairs* (2007) that the reason for the invasion of Iraq in April 2003 by foreign armed forces was a “values” war, a war not for “security” or “regime change”, but for “values change”, his title is “A Battle for Global Values”.

Yet, no principled grounding of this “values war” is anywhere offered. Not one defining criterion of any value substantiates its meaning - although one good after another is proclaimed from “justice” to opposing “unfair trade” to “global poverty”, and “degradation of the planet”. All that is required in such a field of meaning - in this case, the premier journal of record of international-affairs commentary - is the continual invocation of pro-and-con slogans applied to events and perceived trends.
With no accountability to any principle of moral meaning, values can be whatever one wants to claim. They may “saturate experiences and life practices from the smallest microstructures of feeling, thought, and behavior to the largest established macrostructures of organizations and institutions”, but have little or no principled sense. Nor are they obliged to have any in a world where the good is only what people want. In truth Blair’s “values choice” constituted the “supreme crime” under known criteria of international law instituted since the Nuremberg Charter. Yet as elsewhere, these normative bases are bypassed. Principled value grounds, it seems, are avoided as a global convention.

What is truly good is no easy question, all would agree. But whatever it is - and it is what this study seeks to answer in the light of philosophy West and East over 2500 years - it requires a meaning that can tell right from wrong beyond asserting pro-and-con slogans.

1.1.4. Science and Facts Cannot Solve the Problem

“Science” is today widely believed to be sufficient to guide us, but this belief too is unexamined. Science can tell us the patterns of facts, but not whether they are good or bad. Indeed scientific method normally prescribes “value neutrality” to all who would be scientific. But if scientific method is thus “value neutral”, how can it guide us on what is right and wrong?

It may be thought that good and evil are illusions anyway, or mere exclamations - the position of the philosophical school of “logical positivism” led by A.J. Ayer (1910-89). This view argues that since there are not observations that prove value statements as true or false, they are “meaningless”.

As a result of the success of this argument, moral philosophers have moved to discuss what it means to say something is moral or wrong, not whether it is or not. This method is called “meta-ethics”, and it brackets out all substantive value issues. The master puzzle is the logical status of “ought” which - whatever it is, an inference from a subjunctive conditional or a command, or something else - explains nothing about what is good or evil.

Since the moral philosophy of logical positivism has modeled itself on science, the question of good and bad in principle thus disappears as an issue. Values are irrational, and that is an end of the matter.

1.2. The Fallacy of Value-Neutral Science

But is science truly “value neutral”? The assumption that it is can be recognized as false as soon as value analysis discloses the logic of its method - the very rigorous norms in terms of which scientists consistently and consciously judge findings of fact and hypotheses. These norms or “scientific standards” constitute a very strict value system. They prescribe that every step of assertion of fact is rigorously consistent with evidence which can be reproduced by others. Pro and con principles of validity and invalidity - the very essence of a value system - guide every judgment and conclusion. Without these regulating values or standards, science would cease to exist.
Laboratory scientists, for example, are governed by inviolable standards of peer-verifiable evidence and experimental protocol for their work to qualify as scientific. At the same time, invariant and confirmable sequences or probabilities of phenomena must be shown for the results to count as having “scientific value”. These standards must be obeyed for scientists to provide what they themselves call “good science” - what they are obliged to conform to if their work is to be considered valid rather than invalid.

Thus the claim that science is “value neutral” is ultimately absurd - the “value-neutral fallacy”. That this belief has had such sustained currency in our era indicates the great confusion surrounding the values that humans live by. Values govern every activity of our rule-governed species, especially the hard sciences themselves. What scientists really mean is, only these values count in science.

1.2.1. When Science is Good for Us, and When Not

It is because of these strict values that almost all of the rules, tools and advantages we count on as human are the results of scientific method. As long as science moves within its limits, it is humanity’s most valuable tool. Its demands for strict consistency of facts and claims, openness to disconfirming empirical data, and quest for predictive results lead the way of human knowledge for all observable and redundant patterns that exist. But what is not clearly recognized is that these patterns are also the limits of science. Science does not apply to what is neither observable nor redundant.

_Scientism_ is science which exceeds this limit. It is the invalid extension of observable uniform sequences into the sphere of conscious life phenomena to which they do not apply. Yet so basic and consensual is the scientific value system that it comes to appear as the structure of everything real. What does not conform to it does not exist, even our inner lives of thought. This is the scientistic fallacy. Yet so successful have science’s advances been in the physics realm in particular that externally observable and verifiably constant sequences are perceived and demanded everywhere - so that what is not externally observable or not invariant in sequence, such as experiencing life itself and valuing it, is deemed illusory.

1.2.2. The Limits of Scientific Method

In truth, what is of intrinsic human value lies precisely in what does not conform to observable and repetitive patterns. These “fields of life value” and their ultimate ranges of intrinsic life value are analyzed in Chapters Traditions As Moral Anchor In An Age Of Criterionless Relativism;The Primary Axiom And The Life-Value Compass;Good And Evil Within: Opening The Terra Incognita Of The Felt Side Of Being where the onto-axiology of life value is spelled out.

For example, science and scientific method cannot lead us in the ultimate question of what is of value in our lives. They can only help in getting the facts straight about verifiable sequences of phenomena. This is an immensely important task, but it oversteps its bounds where elective life processes are involved - for example, your own next thought. Here a vast realm within and without comes into play that no scientist can predict because it operates on a plane of being that is not space occupying, the realm of
consciousness itself - thought and felt being - which only its bearer can experience directly.

It is a mark of the era’s loss of value bearings that these limits of science are not defined. Yet just as great a problem lies in reifying engineering science’s expressions as capital-T Technology which appears to rule us from without.

1.3. Technology as Materialized Value-Sets

Technology like the science it expresses is typically thought to be “value neutral”. Yet before any technology is established, it is first scientifically validated in some way, and so selected as acceptable by the normative criteria of science. Each advance to a “better” technology is then judged by defined measures of performance which decide which technology is “superior” or “inferior” - all value judgments regulating all technologies which exist. And every such value judgment implies a principle of preference (e.g., less cost, higher velocity) - that is, a value standard.

It is therefore false to claim, as so many do, that “technology is indifferent to values”. A technology is a materialized value system with its value regulators programmed into its performance. To explain the matter in a formal definition: Every step of a technology’s implementation is a fixed option-set mechanically sequenced to achieve certain desired results.

Thus to construe technology as an independent force ruling over humanity is a preconscious fetishism - endowing a human-made object with superhuman powers projected onto it.

1.3.1. Technology as Frankenstein: From Mary Shelley to the World Machine

Technological value-sets only differ from living value-systems by being exactly materialized in a repeat- mechanism whose sequencing is closed and invariant. That is why technologies do not appear to be value-systems - because the choice-steps they fix into invariant order are locked into a uniformity of repetitive operations that abolish subsequent choices from their successful operation. It is just this locking-in operation of science and technology which boxes out the value-choice steps of their construction.

“Frankenstein monster” is the imaginative version of this automaton machine-power operating apparently on its own. Yet even in Mary Shelley’s novel, the monster was known to have a choosing human author and director - a directive value system behind the machine. This governing value-choice sequence has, however, been forgotten in the fetishism of Technology.

Even the famed twentieth-century philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1956) pronounces a form of this hypostasis in his argument in On Technology (1977). Here he says that “everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology” (p. 5). He and others, now an industry of thinkers, block out what is actually dictating technology’s every step. That is, they systematically avoid, that is, the ruling value-system forging every link of “Technology” as an instrumental moment of it.
What is this ruling value system? If we track any contemporary technology through its value-choice construction, we find that every single step of investment, planning, operationalization, marketing and deployment of a technology’s innovation and implementation is typically dedicated to money-value added for its proprietors at each stage. What has occurred to dissolve this value-system governor is a kind of magical thinking. Technology has been hypostacized as an autonomous power “enslaving” humanity when, in fact, it is the servant of a value system which is not seen. Thus mechanisms joined with other mechanisms come to hold people in thrall as an uncontrollable world machine which operates on its own - the source of much science fiction today.

1.4. The Unexamined Life at a System Level

Deeper than the hypostasis of technology has been the absolutization of the global economic order of which it is an instrument, the ruling value system conceived as an autonomous necessity run by iron laws beyond human will or control. What is not recognized is that these laws are in fact imperatives of an inherited normative construction whose universally regulating inner logic of command is, at the highest level of abstraction, to turn money into more money for private money possessors - a value mechanism formalized ahead.

Long prior to global capitalism, societies have related to their inherited social orders as prescribed by all-powerful forces beyond their choice. Seldom is such an order recognized as locked-in until it disappears. Before it falls, conception of its powers is superstitious in structure (from the Latin, “super-stehen”, literally “to stand over”), and not decoded as what it is - a kind of god-system to which any alternative is unthinkable. We may recognize this inner logic of system worship elsewhere, but imagine it as impossible in our own. Yet here as well, we see the same signs. Painful sacrifices are called for to sustain and extend the ruling system. Adoration of its magic and miracles is ritually proclaimed. Public wealth and resources are devoted to ensure renewal of its cycles.

Sober reason knows that every man-made construction is produced and governed in accordance with the directions of human agents through time. The recurrent problem has been that a society’s presupposed and sanctified system of mutual life reproduction is assumed to be conferred by a higher order of rule - an ancestral-ghost hierarchy, eternal divine commands, or inexorable laws of the market that are inalterably given. This is a profound confusion across eras and cultures, and will occupy much analysis of this study. It is never more inertial and dangerous than when it has become global with no tolerated alternative beyond it - approximately our condition today. Here it is especially important to examine rather than presuppose the ruling value system. When Socrates famously said “the unexamined life is not worth living”, he did not only mean the life of the individual, although that is what he is usually taken to mean. He meant more deeply, or so his counsel is considered here, the life of a society or civilization.

1.4.1. The Value-System Rule behind Perceived Higher Necessity

In our era, for example, technology and the capitalist system are assumed - whether by
orthodox or Marxian economics - to be operating in accordance with inalterable laws with inevitable consequences of human development. Yet human decisions operating in accordance with a human-made ruling value mechanism are what decide every moment of the system’s reproduction. It does not run by itself. The problem is that the deciding value-choice space at the system level, as inside a game at the micro level, is assumed away. People “play the game” inside its rules without critical analysis of its regulating values. If the governing value system thus remains unexamined, conformity to its demands is determined prior to conscious reflection. The social construction is thus perceived as an autonomous necessity independent of their wills.

On the other hand, if the dominant cultural values are those of a feudal society, then different rules order collective existence. Modern technology, the primary means of the contemporary money-capital system, may be ruled out as unacceptable and abhorrent - as Galileo’s telescopic astronomy was by the Church fathers in Italy, and as the firearm was by the Bushido warrior caste in Japan. The governing value-system decides without question of it. It is sacrosanct. For example, even in contemporary capitalism itself, no scientific technology is adopted that does not conform to the ruling value principle of maximizing real money returns to private investors. “This is the way the world works”, it is assumed. Even a brilliant new technology that can save countless lives is excluded from production however inexpensive it is if it does not serve this supreme goal. For example, the British Medical Journal reported in an article on December 5 1998 that a daily low-cost dosage of a pill of non-patented components resulted in an 80% reduction of heart attacks in everyone over 55, “a greater impact on the prevention of disease in the Western world than any known prevention”. But no subsequent market manufacture of the combination-pill was undertaken, and public health ministries ignored it for years.

In this way, we may see how a ruling economic mechanism believed to be strictly scientific operates by institutionalized choice-paths governed by a ruling value system which is both unexamined and life-blind.

1.5. The Unseen Chains of Presupposed Ruling Norms

How could such thoroughly value-governed practices as scientific method, technological development and capitalist mechanism have become so widely misconceived as “value neutral”? How could those who decry “technology without ethics” or “capitalist greed” not see that each in fact conforms to a social value system which is itself not called into question.

However silently value presuppositions may regulate thought and choice from beneath awareness of their constraint, all humans do express values or value systems. When such instituted principles of thought and action become habitual and enforced by social acceptance, they typically appear to their bearers as beyond their choice and responsibility. In the contemporary world, it is capital-S “Science” or capital-T “Technology” or the capital-M “Market” which is thought to determine from without by its autonomous necessity.
1.5.1. Reclaiming the Human Author of the Ruling Value Order

Such a ruling value mechanism may seem socially required for stable social order, but this does not alter its nature as a social construction. And we can always choose against as well as for any value we live by within the limits of physical laws. Indeed Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) famously argued in *The New Science* (1724) that humans can only fully understand what they make themselves. Yet ruling value systems have been made an exception by their presupposition as set beyond human choice and control. As the instinctual repertoire is to the herd, so is the social value system to the human society which has not yet evolved to conscious self-determination.

While a rich modern tradition of “social contract theory” has moved from Vico’s insight to the construction of ideal ‘social contracts’ by which humanity ought to be bound - a tradition which goes from Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679) to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) to John Rawls (1921-2006) - no part of this great tradition critically analyses the actual value system by which humanity lives. Consequently, the capitalist value-system itself remains unexamined. John Locke (1632-1704) justifies the system of private property and money exchange as the foundation of state rule and legitimacy, but he attributes its order to divine law and right in an idealized account. The idea that humanity ought to self-determine at the social level - in Rousseau’s idea making the “chains of the law” be self-determined by the “common interest” and “general will” - is a core ideal of this tradition, but only at the political-state level not the economic level, with critical examination of the actually ruling capitalist value system avoided.

1.5.2. Humanity’s Field of Value Choice and Self-Regulation

We might now summarize our condition as follows. Because our lives, our social orders and our civilizations themselves are all embodiments of regulating constructs of value to which we consciously or unconsciously conform through time, we might best understand our human reality as a vast and complex field of values whose regulating norms are adopted, rejected and changed within the ranges of possibility given by physical laws.

Value systems constitute the human meaning of our individual and collective lives within this wide range of material possibility and choice. They are to humanity as instinctual programs are to animals, but are decided by human beings themselves.

1.5.2.1. This is the great general responsibility that humanity has been for the most part unwilling to face at the economic level. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) led the existentialist movement in philosophy that highlighted the responsibility the individual must bear for creating who s/he is, but he did not penetrate to the rule-governed order of the surrounding society by which all are governed. Indeed, he thought the ruling capitalist order was “a monstrous construction with no author”. That this “construction with no author” has in fact been forged in every moment of its rule, reproduction and growth by human decision is apt to be forgotten by individuals who are born and die within it. These are the invisible chains with which moral philosophy and critical inquiry avoid engaging.
1.6. Human Nature: The Animal which Lives By Values

Humans are, after all, the only beings for whom how to live can be an issue. A dog or a bird or a fish merely does what it is impelled to do by its body whose inherited instincts are triggered into formation and action by environmental stimuli. The animal is, as the young Karl Marx (1818-83) put it, “immediately identical with its life activity”. The distinction between what it wants and what is of value, we may add, does not arise to its evident consciousness.

Even in those celebrated instances of kin protection in which a maternal or apical animal of a kin group risks or sacrifices its life security for the benefit of others of the in group, the reaction is not regulated by any principle of value applying beyond the particular kin and circumstances.

1.6.1. Values Must Be Distinguished From Desires

It may be replied that the dog, who represses his desire to move when his master cries “bad!”, experiences a distinction between good and bad. But this is only because it has been trained to obey human prescriptions - on pain of losing what it desires if it does not - food and affection, for example. For the dog, and for the unfree human, there is no question of good or bad beyond success in getting what is wanted.

If the consciousness of the dog did consider such an issue, how could we know? We could know if the animal gave signs of putting its own desire into question - for example, by moving from a plate of food it wants to eat to make room for another who has not eaten at all. When we observe such actions on the part of animals, we find evidence of their being value-bearers - the realm of value beyond the self’s immediate appetite or obedience to a particular master.

1.6.2. Testing for Self-Government by Values

Without language, living in accordance with values does not seem possible because human values are principles governing choice, and principles seem dependent on the abstractions of concepts which, in turn, require language.

Thus it has been widely but mistakenly assumed that non-human beings are not value-bearing because they do not speak a human language. Yet there might be signs of value-behavior without language expressing it - for example, the refusal of an animal to harm another when competing for food, territory or mate. Imagine if animals waiting in queue to feed, not because of the superior powers to bite of those eating before it, but taking turns in accordance with a principle of eating no more than needed when others are still without - as dolphins indicate the capacity for in their feeding, and human beings, more systematically, when they have evolved to collective moral self-government. The signs of this are everywhere that people make rules to protect and enable the lives of all - rules whose meaning and evolving possibility are analyzed in depth in The Lost Social Subject: Evaluating the Rules by Which We Live.
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Spinoza, Baruch (1985), *The Collected Works of Spinoza* (ed. E. Curley), 7 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Includes Spinoza’s *Ethics*, a deductive system modeled on Euclid’s definitions, axioms and theorems in which God or infinite substance is conceived as the rational system of the universe in its thinking and extended modes and infinite attributes which can be better (more adequately) or worse (less adequately) comprehended, from vague experience through general reasoning to scientific intuition (*scientia intuitiva*) of the logically determined whole.]

Vico, G. (1724/1984), *The New Science*, 445 pp. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. [In which Vico argues that humanity can only know for certain that which it has created because it is directly our construction.]


Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968), *Philosophical Investigations*, 260 pp. New York: Macmillan. [The most celebrated work of twentieth-century philosophy leading “the linguistic turn”, featuring the anchoring concept of “language games”, in terms of which philosophical problems are analyzed as linguistic muddles.]

Wollheim, R. (1984), *Thread of Life*, 288 pp. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. [Freudian philosophical critique of the “thread of life” of an individual in which the roots of moral obligation and values respectively are reduced to persecution and depressive anxiety.]


Biographical Sketch

**John McMurtry** holds his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Toronto, Canada and his Ph.D from the University of London, England, and has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph for over 20 years and University Professor Emeritus since 2005. He is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and his many articles, chapters, books and interviews have been internationally published and translated.