THE TRANSCULTURAL IDEA: GOOD AS HAPPINESS AND BAD AS PAIN

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Summary

Although the possibility of any universal value is widely denied by contemporary philosophers, one meta-theory of value stands out as a perennial answer to the question of good and evil - happiness is good and pain is bad. This essay decodes the fatal errors of this enduring idea in world philosophy, and spells out the unrecognized principles of
good pain and suffering which have been differently overlooked by Buddhist, Utilitarian, Market and Nietzschean theories. These criteria of good and evil suffering are then shown to be the underlying core of moral reason and social justice.

2.1. Happiness without Pain: The Eternal Idea across Cultures

The most ancient and enduring idea of the Good across civilizations is being happy and free from pain. This principle seems to express the desire of all sentient being, and it is first given formal recognition and argument in the Four Noble Truths of Shakyamuni Buddha (c.563BCE -483BCE) over 2500 years ago. These Four Noble Truths - of suffering, the cause of suffering, the negation of this cause, and the path to achieve happiness by a Middle Way - constitute the inner logic of Hindu philosophy out of which Buddhism grows as a reform movement repudiating caste, sacrifice of animals, and belief in a supernatural God. Notwithstanding these differences, the shared ultimate goal is emancipation from the pain and suffering of embodied life.

More generally, the elimination of pain and suffering is axiologically presupposed as good across Eastern and Western philosophies. One great difference distinguishes them. The Eastern philosophies focus on an inner or spiritual path to happiness (with notable exceptions like the materialist Carvaka); while non-religious Western philosophies focus on an outer and secular path - in particular, market utility gain by perpetual technological improvements and increased consumer pleasures.

2.1.1. The Market Utility Calculus

In recent decades, the global market has been the dominant mode of achieving happiness without pain. However misled its goal and method, its “marginal utility calculus” is only the received economic version of a more thoughtful and general moral theory called “Utilitarianism”, whose modern form originates with Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73).

The most advanced philosophical statement of this theory is provided by Mill in his work, On Utilitarianism, where he famously asserts: “The Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce pain.” (p. 7). He derives the general idea his theory from Bentham who first originates the concept of the original “utilitarian calculus”. It presumes to count pleasures and debit pains, but founders as a coherent moral calculus because it has no common unit of measure across individual experiences and pain-pleasure types.

The market-capitalist marginal utility theory, however, becomes the ruling answer to this problem from the end of the nineteenth century on. The money price people are willing to pay provides the missing common unit of measure. The nature of “the money sequence of value” in which this metric is embedded has already been critiqued in the first Chapter of this Theme Essay, The Global Crisis of Values. Now we turn our attention to the much wider and unexamined first major premise of value across the ages - that pain is bad.
2.1.2. Elimination of Pain: A Common Ground of Spiritual and Materialist Value Systems

A striking and fundamental difference between Eastern and Western philosophy in general is that Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist philosophies variously proposes negation of desire to achieve happiness, while the dominant tendency of Western philosophy - ancient hedonism and modern utilitarianism in particular - propose the opposite path of fulfillment of desire to achieve happiness. Yet a deeper common ground and major premise of these otherwise opposing doctrines is not analyzed - to be rid of pain and suffering as such.

This great via negativa of human philosophy and common sense is so widely supposed as a natural common ground for all sentient beings that almost no school of thought ever challenges the ultimate assumption. Sometimes, as in the contemporary utilitarian philosophy of Peter Singer (1946 - ), elimination of pain becomes the all-important focus in the human treatment of animals - a view whose onto-ethical paradox is defined in the Bibliography.

The consensual first principle across all versions of this general philosophy of life, however, is constant - that extinguishing pain is always desirable.

2.2. Moral and Non-Moral Values

At the most general level, the value objective to maximize happiness/minimize pain is simply taken for granted across moral and non-moral theories. What is the difference? While moral values imply an obligation to act or refrain from acting in certain ways, there are many values which do not tell us how to act at all, such as aesthetic values (for example, the sublime experience of a wilderness sunset, or Michelangelo’s Sistine chapel ceiling in the Vatican). So we straightway confront a meta-issue in the pro-happiness/anti-pain idea as a universal theory of value.

2.2.1. The Defining Principles of Moral Doctrines

The same issue, however, applies as much to utilitarianism’s main rivals - deontological or duty ethics, emotivism, contractarianism, self-realizationist and virtue ethics, and religious morality. Since morality is by its nature restricted to values which enjoin obligations, values which entail no obligation in themselves - like aesthetic value - fall outside the moral realm of value. Accordingly, a moral principle, even if true, cannot as such satisfy the quest for a universal theory of value with no limit of validity. One’s duty as a utilitarian, for example, is to promote the general happiness (a consequentialist ethic); as a Kantian to will the maxim of one’s action as a universal law (a deontological ethic); as a Marxist to promote the collective interests of the producing class (a self-realizationist ethic); and as a Mohammedan to submit to the established rules of Islam as the will of Allah (a religious ethic).

Yet however important these values are to their adherents, they cannot extend to values whose nature falls outside the reach of principles telling us how we ought to live. It is in this way that we come to understand how much more demanding a general theory of
value is. It must be more encompassing than even a universal morality - and even it is now widely thought to be unattainable.

2.3. Aesthetic Value versus Moral Value

Thinkers as polar opposite as Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), for example, consider the value of art as a freedom from the demands of any moral requirement. For Wilde and others, “art is for art’s sake”. For Kant, art expresses “a free play of the imagination”. For both, art is intrinsic value released from any function.

Although Kant and Wilde could hardly be more opposed in their philosophies, they agree as most theorists do that aesthetic value is wholly value in-itself. That is what makes it art, it is supposed, rather than craft, or advertisement, or ideology.

2.3.1. Distinguishing the Beautiful from the Moral

Consider in support of this position, for instance, the purely aesthetic value of hearing a movement of a Beethoven symphony, or seeing snow and ice on trees, or a Quetzal plumage in the forest. These values do not serve a function beyond themselves, and they do not tell one how to act. They are not good because they conform one’s will to one’s duty (deontological ethics) or produce happy consequences (utilitarianism or consequentialism). Their value as aesthetic experiences is to transport us to a realm beyond the obligatory or the functional - beauty and the sublime as an end in itself.

2.3.2. Towards a Synthesis of the Moral and the Aesthetic

Insofar as utilitarianism or Buddhism is a moral theory, then, it does what all moral theories do explicitly or implicitly: it prescribes forms of intention/action, and punishment or guilt for failure to comply.

That is why Mill writes in On Utilitarianism: “We do not call anything moral unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some or other way for doing it - - - by law, by opinion of his fellow creatures - - [or] by the reproaches of his own conscience” ( p. 246). It seems odd to say one ought to have conscience pangs or be punished for bad taste, and that is why taste or aesthetic value is different from moral value. Mill’s criterion of the moral reveals the moral-aesthetic distinction well.

Therefore, the argument concludes, no maximize-happiness-and-reduce-pain moral theory, or any other moral theory, can be adequate as a general theory of the good. It is too narrow by all non-moral value it excludes. This is a feature of moral theories in the strict sense which has led many contemporaries to reject moral doctrines per se - as surrealist, relativist and postmodern movements have in fact done.

Conversely, aesthetic value does not cover moral value either. They are distinct realms of value, or so it is supposed. What has been long missing is a principle of synthesis of the moral and the beautiful by a deeper, unifying principle of value which covers them both and all other values as well. This is the universal axiom of all value whatever which is explained in depth in The Primary Axiom and the Life-value Compass.
2.4. Neoclassical Consumer Theory: Man as Pleasure Machine

It might be objected that the happiness concept of the good can itself be extended to non-moral values as a unifying principle without limit of validity. That is, it is arguable that aesthetic and other non-moral values can all be explained as species of the unifying value of happiness.

Consider, for example, market theory and practice which supposes pleasure maximization (consumerism) as the first principle of all value choice. In this globally dominant idea of the good, paying a price is *equated to* the happiness or utility received from it - the primary equation of “marginal utility theory”. Thus willingness-to-pay-the-price confers what value there is on anything and everything. This is the value doctrine of the global market.

2.4.1. Locking in Life-Blind Economics by Mathematical Formalism

Frances Edgeworth, a founder of neoclassical theory, explains in his pioneering work *Mathematical Psychics* (1881) the mechanics of this ruling paradigm in one concise sentence. “The conception of man as a pleasure machine”, he wrote, “may justify the employment of mechanical terms and mathematical reasoning in social science” (p.15). Edgeworth’s principle has since been the first major premise of method and value of modern economics

Although this mathematical mechanist version of the happiness-maximization principle is the theoretical core of neoclassical theory and contemporary economic policy, it is philosophically degenerate - a hyper-reductionist value theory which is ultimately life-blind. No other value but consumer pleasure as measured by price paid registers. Once locked into mathematical numbers and graphs without quality, such a value system can become socially disastrous as explained in other sections of this study.

2.5. Does the Value Maximize Happiness/Minimize Pain Have Unlimited Validity?

One need not be confined to the market-utility doctrine in considering the general value theory of maximization of happiness/minimization of pain. The scenic beauty of nature, for example, one could argue, is of aesthetic value because it produces happiness and reduces pain without any money price involved. One could say much the same of music. It is good as art so far as it releases its listeners into a state of spontaneous joy. One could also reason that love and friendship are of value insofar as they bring us happiness, and misery without them.

In this universal form, the maximize-happiness/minimize-pain principle seems to work across all regions of value. Can it be applied with unlimited validity to all value situations whatever? Certainly no other principle of value has been so enduring across East and West, ancient past and global present. From ancient Epicurean philosophy in Greek and Roman societies and the ageless Carvaka of the Indian subcontinent to the hedonist logic of neoclassical and neoliberal doctrine today, all posit pleasure as the ultimate good and pain as evil. Religions themselves, it could be argued, are all variations on the same theme - happiness/heaven conferred by God for our goodness, and pain/hell for our badness.
2.5.1. Sophisticated Utilitarianism versus Market Utilitarianism

There are differences to be sure even within the secular branches of this theory. Epicureanism and Millean utilitarianism, for example, are clear, as consumer hedonism is not, to count mental pleasure as of greater value than consumption pleasure on account of its capacity to increase pleasure through a lifetime. Under this explanation of happiness, thus, learning outperforms external entertainment for happiness gains. Perhaps no distinction is more important, but is lost within the dominant consumer ethic.

So why, given such explanatory power in its sophisticated versions, is more happiness/less pain not an ultimate and universal principle of value by which we can always live better?

2.6. The Unexplained Value: Good Pain

Consider great works of art whose composition is calculated to produce acute anguish in the viewer. One needs only to think of the grotesquely beautiful drawings of Goya, the terror-filled mural of Guernica by Picasso, the finalist pessimism of Thomas Hardy’s novels, to recognize the thinness of any pleasure account of artistic value.

Pleasure may be a typical effect of good art, but other moods it moves us to are perfectly compatible with art’s value. Indeed the value of the work may be inseparable from the fact that it makes us feel pain the more deeply we are impressed by it, as with all of the preceding examples.

2.6.1. Art as Liberation from Shallow Normalcy

Then too, theories of art like abstract expressionism and, of wholly different hue, the Hegelian Marxism of Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), prize art because they claim by different arguments that it negates conventional or established lines of image and thought, liberating us into a more inclusive sensibility than experienced before.

Added pleasure quite misses the value of such horizon-expanding overthrows of what we are habituated to. Such negations of the given may in fact make us very uncomfortable or deeply unsettle us, but that does not take away from the value of the work. It may be its greatest value. Tolstoy’s complexly tragic novels, Marx’s excruciating imagery of denunciation, Orwell’s pessimism (T.S. Eliot would not publish his Animal Farm when editor with Faber and Faber) - all of these works are of aesthetic value in large part because of their breaking apart our comfort zones.

2.6.2. First Glimpse of the Value of All Values

The life-value onto-axiology, in contrast, finds the value of all art alike to be, more precisely, in direct proportion to its opening our senses or emotions to what has not been thought or felt before - rooting the worth of art in the new range of vital experience - thought and feeling - it arises. As long as the life ranges are more inclusive than before, they are better - whether by release from standard forms of representation, repression of erotic energy, or other confining normalcy.
Here we find our first full glimpse of the life-value theory as a comprehensive onto-axiology. The artist who succeeds in opening new fields of life experience in others by the art is not merely a pleasure maker. S/he is a creator of a new world which may be fashioned by tongues of fire or explosive visual forms. The test of value is certainly not happiness production.

2.6.3. Poignant Beauty

Those who respond - “but I am filled with the art’s beauty again and again in beholding it, how can one return to the painful?” - help us to recognize that “the opening of the doors of perception”, in William Blake’s words, can timelessly recur - even if unbearably poignant.

According to this logic of aesthetic value, in other words, the value of art cannot be explained by the ruling hedonic calculus. Insofar as intensely painful art can be the most moving, its value contradicts the happiness principle. That is, the opposite of pleasure may occur without diminishing the value of the art, but, on the contrary, constituting its value advance.

Happiness, in short, is only one sort of experience the value of the work of art consists in among other opposed possibilities - including anguish, awe, horror. One cannot call emotional anguish a pleasure unless the meanings of concepts are disregarded.

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self-realization). Also includes Aristotle’s Poetics which provides the argument for “catharsis” or purgation of the emotions of pity and fear - generally painful or negative emotions - by their artistic representation in poetic drama for which his work is the canonical analysis]

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Russell, Bertrand (1983- ), *Bertrand Russell: Collected Papers*, 29 vols. London: Allen and Unwin. [Includes Russell’s prolific corpus of philosophical and public works, including his of ‘type theory’ of logically higher and lower order classes of properties (e.g., the color property of colored objects is a higher order property than the combination of all of the members of the class of colored objects). His works on denotation and description, the logical foundations of mathematics, sense data and logical atomism, neutral monism, and probability comprise a string of innovative technical solutions and theories to resolve paradoxes, with his theory of types being the most enduring contribution to logic and epistemology. An early leader of Anglo-American technical analytic philosophy, his most substantive contribution may be in his many irreverent popular essays and books which lucidly expose and rout well-entrenched beliefs and dogmatic assumptions on major social issues from sexual morality to nuclear-arms. He regretted twentieth-century philosophy’s wide abandonment of “understanding the world itself”, that grave and important task which philosophy throughout has hitherto pursued].

Samuelson, Paul and Nordhaus W.D. (2005), *ECONOMICS*, 784 pp. New York: McGraw-Hill. [The standard global reference text and classic of neoclassical economics in which the senior author welcomes its currency across continents and educational levels in terms which reveal the received scriptural authority of this school and its assumption of being all of “economics”: “Spread the gospel of economics anyway we can, I say”. Very clear system account.]

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1972), *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. 2 Vols. London: Verso Books. [Sartre’s major work after his earlier 1953 classic of existential phenomenology, *Being and Nothingness*. It is a work which seeks to synthesize individual existential choice with Marxian dialectical reason and class analysis in The Problem of Method (published as an independent volume), which explains that a “hierarchical totalization of determinations” show the compatibility of opposed philosophical movements. As with Marcuse’s work, ignored by mainstream philosophers once identification with Marxian thought became evident.]

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1973), *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, 94 pp. London: Methuen [Originally published as *Esquisse d’emotions* in 1962, Sartre’s direct analysis of emotional life in which they are analyzed as agitations.]


Sen, A (1998), *The Possibility of Social Choice*, 37pp. Trinity College, Cambridge: Nobel Lecture [This lecture provides an incomparably rich documentation of the literature on social choice, demonstrating there is no conception of social choice in received social science or philosophy other than as an aggregation of
individual choosers: an atomic metaphysic of choice to which collective agency and responsibility at the level of ultimate principles of value and social regulators cannot compute in principle.]


Singer, Irving (1966 -1987), The Nature of Love, 3 volumes. Chicago: Chicago University Press. [The most comprehensive study of theories of love from Plato to Sartre, which argues against any unifying principle of value in a richly learned tapestry of analysis which features the “grace” of love as “bestowal of value” on the love object, the implied source of love’s happiness.]

Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation: Man’s Inhumanity to Animals (1983). 302 pp. Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Thorsons Press. [The definitive work by the best known advocate of animal rights, who deploys utilitarian ethics and the pain-reduction principle to argue against the standardized cruel abuse of domestic animals in factory food production; failing to see that this generalized ethic of suffering-free treatment of animals implies that pain-free domesticated animals have better lives within this condition, which further implies that they ought to substitute for animals experiencing much pain and suffering in the wilderness.]

Smith, Adam (1776/1966), An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2 vols. New York: A.M. Kelley. [Possibly the most materially influential work in history, the full text, which is often expurgated to select out such passages as the following which discloses the suffering linchpin of the “economic laws of supply and demand” upon which Smith builds modern economic theory, “[The] demand for men, like any other commodity, quickens when it goes on too slowly, and stops when advance too fast. It is this demand which regulates and determines the state of propagation in all the different countries of the world”.]

Spinoza, Baruch (1985), The Collected Works of Spinoza (ed. E. Curley), 7 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Spinoza’s greatest work, the Ethics, is a deductive system modeled on Euclid’s definitions, axioms and theorems in which God or infinite substance is conceived as the rational system of the universe in its thinking and extended modes and infinite attributes: which can be better (more adequately) or worse (less adequately) comprehended: from vague and emotional experience through general reasoning to scientific intuition (scientia intuitiva) of the logically determined whole from the comprehensively rational experience of it - ultimately the true “self interest” of the individual.]
lectures on his “process philosophy” which conceives Nature as “alive”, “feeling”, “purposing” and ever “creative” in the energy flows described by physics (the totality of which processes he conceives as God), as opposed to “dead” and “inert” in the Newtonian tradition: an opposition he brings into his more famous philosophy of education which emphasizes imagination and feeling as well as reason through stages achieving their ordered balance of expression. He concludes this work with a typically arresting apothegm, “poetry allies itself to metre, philosophy to mathematic pattern”.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968), *Philosophical Investigations*. 260 pp. New York: Macmillan. [Perhaps the most celebrated work of twentieth-century philosophy, it leads what philosophers have come to call “the linguistic turn”, disconnecting philosophical problems from the life-ground in preoccupation with linguistic and logical muddles with no reference beyond their “language games”.

Wollheim, R. (1984), *Thread of Life*, 288 pp. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. [A Freudian philosophical critique of the “thread of life” of an individual in which the roots of moral obligation and values respectively are reduced to persecution and depressive anxiety.]

M.E. Zimmerman, J.B. Callicott, J.Clark, G. Sessions, K. J. Warren eds. (1998). *Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology*. Prentice Hall: London (The most critically wide-ranging text in the field of philosophy of the environment with articles by such well-known figures as Thomas Berry, Aldo Leopold (the pioneer of the Land Ethic), Arne Ness (definitive account of Deep Ecology by the founder), Carolyn Merchant (defining excerpts from *The Death of Nature*), James O’Connor (leader of socialism and ecology movement), Tom Regan, Peter Singer, Paul Taylor (animal rights), Gary Snyder (bio-regionalism), and the editors (covering such fields as ecofeminism and social ecology).

**Biographical Sketch**

**John McMurtry** holds his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Toronto, Canada and his Ph.D from the University of London, England, and has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph for over 20 years and University Professor Emeritus since 2005. He is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and his many articles, chapters, books and interviews have been internationally published and translated.