PROOF THEORY AND CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS

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Contents

1. Introduction
   1.1. Constructivism
   1.2. Proof Theory
2. Intuitionistic Logic, I
   2.1. The BHK-interpretation
   2.2. Natural Deduction; Formulas as Types
   2.3. The Hilbert-type Systems Hi and Hc
   2.4. Metamathematics of I and its Relation to classical logic C
3. Semantics of Intuitionistic logic
   3.1. I-completeness
   3.2. Kripke semantics
   3.3. Topological and Algebraic Semantics
4. Intuitionistic (Heyting) arithmetic, HA
   4.1. Realizability
   4.2. Characterization of Realizability
5. Constructive Mathematics
   5.1. Bishop’s Constructive Mathematics (BCM)
   5.2. Constructive Recursive Mathematics (CRM)
   5.3. Intuitionism (INT)
   5.4. Lawless Sequences and I-validity
   5.5. Comparison of BCM, CRM and INT
6. Proof Theory of first-order logic
   6.1. The Gentzen systems Gc and Gi
   6.2. Cut Elimination
   6.3. Natural Deduction and Normalization
   6.4. The Tait-Calculus
7. Proof Theory of mathematical theories
7.1. The language
7.2. Order types
7.3. Truth-Complexity
7.4. The Proof-theoretic Ordinal of a Theory
7.5. The Method
Glossary
Bibliography
Biographical Sketch

Summary

An introduction to the constructive point of view in the foundations of mathematics, in particular intuitionism due to L.E.J. Brouwer, constructive recursive mathematics due to A.A. Markov, and Bishop’s constructive mathematics, is provided in this chapter. The constructive interpretation and formalization of logic is described. For constructive (intuitionistic) arithmetic, Kleene’s realizability interpretation is given; this provides an example of the possibility of a constructive mathematical practice, which diverges from classical mathematics. The crucial notion in intuitionistic analysis, choice sequence, is briefly described and some principles, which are valid for choice sequences, are discussed. The second half of the article deals with some aspects of proof theory, i.e. the study of formal proofs as combinatorial objects. Gentzen’s fundamental contributions are outlined: his introduction of the so-called Gentzen systems, which use sequents instead of formulas and his result on first-order arithmetic showing that (suitably formalized) transfinite induction up to the ordinal $\varepsilon_0$ cannot be proved in first-order arithmetic.

1. Introduction

1.1. Constructivism

Since the beginning of the twentieth century several positions w.r.t. the foundations of mathematics have been formulated which might be said to be versions of constructivism.

Typically, a constructivist view demands of mathematics some form of explicitness of the objects studied, they must be concretely representable, or explicitly definable, or capable of being viewed as mental constructions. We distinguish five variants of constructivism in this chapter: finitism, predicativism, intuitionism (INT), constructive recursive mathematics (CRM), and Bishop’s constructive mathematics (BCM). We will be brief about finitism and predicativism, and concentrate on the other three instead.

Finitism insists on concrete representability of the objects of mathematics and avoids the higher abstractions. Thus, particular functions from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$ are considered, but the notion of an arbitrary function from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$ is avoided, etc. This curtails the use of logic, in particular the use of quantifiers over infinite domains. Infinite domains are regarded as indefinitely extendable finite domains rather than as completed infinite totalities. Finitism is not only of interest as a version of constructivism, but also as a key ingredient in Hilbert’s original program: Hilbert wanted to establish consistency of
formal mathematical theories by ‘finitistic’ means, since he regarded these as evidently justified and uncontroversial (see also below under 1.2).

Predicativism concentrates on the explicitness and non-circular character of definitions. As a rule, in the predicativist approach the natural numbers are taken for granted; but sets of natural numbers have to be explicitly defined, and in defining a mathematical entity $A$ say, the definition should not refer to the totality of objects of which $A$ is an element.

Intuitionism (INT). Intuitionism, as it is understood here, is due to the Dutch mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer (1881–1966). The basic tenets of intuitionism may be summarily described as follows.

1. Mathematics is not formal; the objects of mathematics are mental constructions in the mind of the (ideal) mathematician. Only the thought constructions of the (idealized) mathematician are exact.

2. Mathematics is independent of experience in the outside world, and mathematics is in principle also independent of language. Communication by language may serve to suggest similar thought constructions to others, but there is no guarantee that these other constructions are the same. (This is a solipsistic element in Brouwer’s philosophy.)

3. Mathematics does not depend on logic; on the contrary, logic is part of mathematics.

The first item not only leads to the rejection of certain theorems of classical logic, but also opens a possibility for admitting deviant objects, the “forever incomplete” choice sequences. Just as for Constructive Recursive Mathematics (CRM), the mathematical theories of INT are not simply sub-theories of their classical counterparts, but may actually be incompatible with the corresponding classical theory.

Constructive Recursive Mathematics (CRM). A.A. Markov (1903–1979) formulated in 1948–49 the basic ideas of constructive recursive mathematics (CRM for short). They are the following:

1. Objects of constructive mathematics are constructive objects, concretely: words in various alphabets.

2. The abstraction of potential existence (potential realizability) is admissible but the abstraction of actual infinity is not allowed. Potential realizability means e.g., that we may regard addition as a well-defined operation for all natural numbers, since we know how to complete it for arbitrarily large numbers. This admissibility is taken to include acceptance of ‘Markov’s Principle’: if it is impossible that an algorithmic computation does not terminate, it does in fact terminate. The rejection of actual infinity is tantamount to the rejection of classical logic.
3. A precise notion of algorithm is taken as a basis (Markov chose for this his own notion of ‘Markov-algorithm’). Since Markov-algorithms are encoded by words in suitable alphabets, they are objects of CRM; conversely, each word in some definite alphabet may be interpreted as a Markov algorithm.

4. Logically compound statements have to be interpreted so as to take the preceding points into account.

Markov’s principle holds neither in INT nor in Bishop’s Constructive Mathematics (BCM).

Bishop’s Constructive Mathematics (BCM). Errett Bishop (1928–1983) formulated his version of constructive mathematics around 1967. There is a single “ideological” principle underlying BCM:

1. proofs of existential statements must provide a method of constructing the object satisfying the specifications,

and three more pragmatic guiding rules for the development of BCM:

2. avoid concepts defined in a negative way;

3. avoid defining irrelevant concepts — that is to say, among the many possible classically equivalent, but constructively distinct definitions of a concept, choose the one or two which are mathematically fruitful ones, and disregard the others;

4. avoid pseudo-generality, that is to say, do not hesitate to introduce an extra assumption if it facilitates the theory and is satisfied by the examples one is interested in.

Starting from the principles outlined above, three distinct versions of mathematics have been developed, which differ notably in their respective theories of the continuum, as will be explained further on.

1.2. Proof Theory

Proof theory owes its origin to Hilbert’s Program, i.e., the project of establishing freedom of contradiction for formally codified (substantial parts of) mathematics, using elementary, “evident” reasoning (finitistic reasoning). As shown by Gödel, in its original form this program was bound to fail. However, a modification of the program has been successful; one then asks to establish consistency using “evident” means of proof, possibly stronger than the system whose consistency is to be established.

*Structural proof theory* studies formal mathematical (logical) proofs as combinatorial structures; various styles of formalization are compared.
Hilbert-Schütte style proof theory takes its starting point from Gentzen’s consistency proof for arithmetic, and compares formal systems with respect to their proof-theoretic strength, by analyzing the structure of suitably devised deduction systems.

Interpretational proof theory compares formalisms via syntactic translations or interpretations. We shall encounter various examples below.

2. Intuitionistic Logic, I

Although Brouwer was positively averse to formalization of mathematics, he was nevertheless the first to formulate and establish some principles of intuitionistic logic. But Kolmogorov in 1925 and Heyting in 1930 demonstrated that intuitionistic logic could be studied as a formalism. Formalizations of intuitionistic logic need an informal interpretation to justify them as codifications of intuitionistic logic. Heyting (1930, 1934) and Kolmogorov (1932) each developed such an interpretation; their interpretations were later to be seen to be essentially equivalent. Heyting in particular built on some of Brouwer’s early papers.

2.1. The BHK-interpretation

The need for a different logic in the setting of INT, BCM and CRM becomes clear by considering some informal examples.

The following is not acceptable as a constructive definition of a natural number:

\[ n = 2 \text{ if } R \text{ holds, } n = 3 \text{ if } \neg R \text{ holds}, \]

where \( R \) stands for some mathematically unsolved problem, e.g., \( R = \) The Riemann hypothesis. This is not a constructive definition because we cannot identify \( n \) with one of the explicitly given natural numbers \( 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots \); for such an identification to be possible, we have to decide whether \( R \) or \( \neg R \) holds, i.e., to decide the Riemann hypothesis. Note that the definition becomes acceptable as soon as problem \( R \) has been solved.

Example of a non-constructive proof: Consider the following statement: there exist irrational numbers \( a, b \) such that \( a^b \) is rational. This statement has a very simple proof:

\[ \sqrt{2^\sqrt{2}} \text{ is either rational or irrational. In the first case, take } a = b = \sqrt{2}. \text{ In the second case, take } a = \sqrt{2^\sqrt{2}}, b = \sqrt{2}. \] The proof is obviously non-constructive, since it does not permit us to compute \( a \) with any desired degree of accuracy. A constructive proof of the statement is possible, for example, by an appeal to a non-trivial theorem of Gelfond: if \( a \notin \{0, 1\}, a \text{ algebraic, } b \text{ irrational algebraic, then } a^b \text{ is irrational, even transcendental.} \]

INT, BCM and CRM have the same logical basis, called intuitionistic logic or constructive logic, and which is a subsystem of classical predicate logic. The standard informal interpretation of logical operators in intuitionistic logic is the so-called proof-interpretation or Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK-interpretation for short). The formalization of intuitionistic logic started before this interpretation was
actually formulated, but it is preferable to discuss the BHK-interpretation first since it facilitates the understanding of the more technical results.

We use capitals $A, B, C, \ldots$ for arbitrary formulas. Our logical operators are $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \perp, \forall, \exists$. We treat $\neg A$ as an abbreviation of $A \rightarrow \perp$, and we use $\equiv$ denotes identity of strings and $\equiv$ for definitions. If $E$ is a syntactic expression, we write $E[x/t]$ for the result of substituting the term $t$ for the free variable $x$ in $E$; it is tacitly assumed that $t$ is free for $x$ in $E$, that is to say, no variable free in $t$ becomes bound after substitution. We often use a more informal notation: if $()x E$ has been introduced in the discourse as an expression $E$ with some free occurrences of the variable $x$, we write $()t E$ for $E[x/t]$.

On the BHK-interpretation, the meaning of a statement $A$ is given by explaining what constitutes a proof of $A$, and proof of $A$ for logically compound $A$ is explained in terms of what it means to give a proof of its constituents. Thus:

1. A proof of $A \wedge B$ is given as a pair of proofs $\langle p, q \rangle$, where $p$ is a proof of $A$ and $q$ is a proof of $B$.
2. A proof of $A \lor B$ is of the form $\langle 0, p \rangle$, where $p$ is a proof of $A$, or $\langle 1, q \rangle$, where $q$ a proof of $B$.
3. A proof of $A \rightarrow B$ is a construction $q$ which transforms any proof $p$ of $A$ into a proof $q(p)$ of $B$.
4. Absurdity $\perp$ (‘the contradiction’) has no proof; a proof of $\neg A$ is a construction which transforms any supposed proof of $A$ into a proof of $\perp$.

To understand the meaning of the last chance for negation, note that this amounts to saying that $A$ has no proof; and in this case every functional construction will do as a proof of $\neg A$.

In the quantifier clauses, we assume the individual variables to range over a domain $D$; the fact that $d \in D$ for some $d$ is not supposed to need further proof. (This is sometimes expressed by calling $D$ a basic domain; $\mathbb{N}$ is an example.)

5. A proof $p$ of $\forall x A(x)$ is a construction transforming any $d \in D$ into a proof $p(d)$ of $A(d)$.
6. A proof $p$ of $\exists x A(x)$ is a pair $\langle d, q \rangle$ with $d \in D$, $q$ a proof of $A(d)$.

The concepts of proof and construction in these explanations are to be taken as primitive; “proof” is not to be identified with any notion of deduction in any formal system. Obviously, the constructions in the clauses for implication and the universal quantifier are (constructive) functions.
Let us write $\lambda x.t(x)$ for $t(x)$ as a function of $x$ (so $(\lambda x.t(x))(d) = t(d)$). As an example of the BHK-interpretation, let us argue that $\neg(A \lor \neg A)$ is valid on this interpretation.

(i) If $u$ proves $A$, then $\langle 0, u \rangle$ proves $A \lor \neg A$.
(ii) If $v$ proves $\neg(\neg(A \lor \neg A))$ and $\langle 0, u \rangle$ proves $A \lor \neg A$, then $v(0, u)$ proves $\perp$.
(iii) If $v$ proves $\neg(\neg(A \lor \neg A))$, then $\lambda u. v(0, u)$ proves $\neg A$ (by (i) and (ii)).
(iv) If $w$ proves $\neg A$, then $\langle 1, w \rangle$ proves $A \lor \neg A$, so $\langle 1, \lambda u. v(0, u) \rangle$ proves $A \lor \neg A$ by (iii).
(v) If $v$ proves $\neg(A \lor \neg A)$, then $\langle 1, \lambda u. v(0, u) \rangle$ proves $\perp$ by (iv).
(vi) $\lambda v. v(1, \lambda u. v(0, u))$ proves $\neg(\neg(A \lor \neg A))$ (by (v)).

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introduction to BCM, INT and CRM, both mathematical practice as well as the metamathematics. Not much structural proof theory, but a long discussion of completeness questions and semantics.]

Biographical Sketch

Anne S. Troelstra is Emeritus Professor of Pure Mathematics and Foundations of Mathematics, at the Institute of Logic, Language and Information (ILLC) of the University of Amsterdam. He has worked primarily in Proof Theory and Constructive Mathematics, and he has written with Dirk van Dalen one of the classic textbooks in this area. He has been a member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences since 1976, and in 1996 he was awarded the F.L. Bauer-prize of the "Bund der Freunde der Technischen Universita"t Mu"nchen" for internationally outstanding contributions to Computer Science.