

## **POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

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### **Summary**

Given several rounds of debates on political economy and security over the past 200 years, what have we learnt and what can we learn from them? Starting with liberal free trade idealism, I move on, via national economics and Marxism, to examine anticipations and explanations of the First World War now known as classical theories of imperialism. Political realists of the 1930s and 1940s developed a partly related, partly original critique of the liberal thesis of natural harmony of interests. It was, however, the economic theory of Keynes that laid the theoretical foundations for the Bretton Woods institutions, providing countervailing mechanisms against tendencies towards major economic crises and escalation of conflicts. The partial erosion of those institutions in the early 1970s, and the subsequent rise of neoliberalism, has spelled a partial return to the 19<sup>th</sup> century principles, albeit in a very different context. From a global Keynesian perspective, however, the contemporary neoliberal economic order is contradictory and unsustainable. I discuss also some of the limits of global Keynesianism – why new 21<sup>st</sup> century ideas are needed.

### **1. Introduction**

What have we learnt about the political economy conditions of war and peace? Scholarly and political debates over this question have continued at least since the

French revolutionary wars of 1792-1802. They have been intensive since 1848, the year of failed liberal revolutions in Europe, and especially since 1914, the outbreak of the First World War. Does capitalist market economy – and thus also international free trade – lead to a harmony of interests, as if guided by an invisible hand? Are there essential conflicts within capitalist market society that can only be resolved politically? What is the impact of these conflicts on international relations? Are there aggregate-level mechanisms that generate, through unintended consequences of manifold actions, economic problems and crises that may lead to counterproductive or even aggressive international responses? What kinds of international institutions would be adequate for countering these tendencies? How do the existing institutions work?

If wealth and growth are based on division of labour in what is essentially a world economy, what ensures that its basic rules and principles are followed? Does order in the world economy take the leadership of a single state, or is non-hegemonic international cooperation possible? Is it possible that a neoliberal international order – whether hegemonic or cooperative – is itself contradictory and thus a source of problems and conflicts that may lead to its own erosion? Can the early 21<sup>st</sup> century turn out, in some ways, similar to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century? To what extent would various global green-Keynesian proposals for reforming systems of global governance amend the situation? What are the limits of global governance; ultimately, is a legitimate global monopoly of violence and thus a world state somehow necessary?

Answers to these questions presuppose economic theories. Since Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, the idea of harmony of interests in free markets has been taken as providing a generator, guarantee and strategy of peace. While in practice free trade has been interwoven with the means of organised violence in a complicated way, any criticism of the orthodox liberal economic theory has implications for our understanding of international or global security. Whether criticism stems from the notion of class conflict, unequal exchange, underconsumption, financial instability, insufficient aggregate demand, business cycles of various lengths, or effects of asymmetric power, the point is always that free capitalist market exchange constitutes conflicts and causes problems that encourage not only political but also military responses. The lack of adequate political responses may result in a spiral of downward developments that involve escalation of conflicts and potentially war.

The substance of adequate political responses cannot be reduced to economic theories only. The categories of economic theory are intermingled with these political conceptions; and vice versa. A lot depends on whether there are mitigating politico-economic mechanisms capable of preventing the potential downward developments from coming to the worst, or whether such mechanisms can be created. But whatever our economic theory of these mechanisms, the adequacy of political responses depend also on complex considerations about human nature, the nature of power and the state, the nature of conflicts and politics, the meaning of territoriality, the functions of international mechanisms and institutions, the meaning of new forces of destruction, and so on.

The state of the art of the political economy of international security can best be evaluated from a historical perspective. I am asking: given several rounds of debates on

political economy and security over the past 200 years, what have we learnt and what can we learn from them? Starting with a straightforward Kantian case for liberal free trade idealism, I move on, via national economics and Marxism, to examine anticipations and explanations of the First World War now known as classical theories of imperialism. Political realists of the 1930s and 1940s developed a partly related, partly original critique of the liberal thesis of natural harmony of interests. It was, however, the economic theory of John Maynard Keynes that laid the theoretical foundations for the Bretton Woods institutions, providing countervailing mechanisms against tendencies towards major economic crises and escalation of conflicts.

The partial erosion of those institutions in the early 1970s, and the subsequent rise of neoliberalism, was at first theorised in terms of hegemonic cycles, especially by US-based neorealists and world system analysts. A more positive contribution was made by those who argued that institutional cooperation is possible also in the absence of a single leading or dominating state. Thus the free trade and private property principles of the WTO have been deepened and strengthened while various transnational and international regulatory agreements and frameworks have proliferated. From a global Keynesian perspective, however, the contemporary neoliberal economic order is contradictory and unsustainable. This suggests a need for new rules, principles and institutions. In conclusion, I discuss also some of the limits of global Keynesianism – why new 21<sup>st</sup> century ideas are needed.

## **2. Free Trade and Peace**

How is it possible to have an organised and relatively peaceful society in the absence of God and his commands? This is the modern problem of order. The great innovation of 18th century Europe was to direct human passions to the service of generally beneficial order (see Hirschman 1977). David Hume (1715/1777) was one of the key theorists of this new idea. Hume argued that in many cases private passions, including the ‘passion of interest,’ can best be controlled by means of countervailing passions. Love of leisure can be countered with the lust for gain. One faction of state can counter another faction of state, both driven by passion for power and glory. It is therefore possible to engineer social progress by setting up one passion to fight another.

Hume was ambivalent about the notions of interest and passion. Increasingly since the early 17th century, prevalent discourses had contrasted ‘interest,’ which tended to acquire an economic meaning, against ‘passion’. Whereas the aggressive pursuit of possessions by means of violence and power seemed a source of misery and evil, the rational money-making of the bourgeoisie in a stable and just setting, based on producing and exchanging goods, services and assets, appeared beneficial to many. Thus rose the great civilizational quest to fabricate the calculative self-interested man. In a particular social setting, characterised by Hume’s three fundamental rules of justice – stability of possession, transfer by consent, and keeping of promises – calculative money-making appeared to benefit everybody (i.e. property owning men).

In 1776, Adam Smith, who had pleased Hume by summarising his *Treatise* so insightfully as a young student, invented just in passing the metaphor of the ‘invisible hand,’ in the context of arguing that lifting ‘restraints on importation of goods’ may *not*

do that much harm after all (Smith 1910/1776: 400). When generalised – as his followers did in the 19<sup>th</sup> century – Smith’s metaphor describes how individual self-interested actions can lead to order and progress. For the sake of making money, people produce things that other people are willing to buy. Buyers spend money for those things that they need or want most. When buyers and sellers meet in the market, a pattern of production develops, which results in harmony. Smith said that all this would happen without any conscious control or direction, as if by an invisible hand.

In the course of the 18th century, three social mechanisms – besides state coercion – were developed: the invisible hand; checks and balances within a state; and balance of power between states. On the basis of the 18th century experiences – Europe was facing constant warfare among the great powers throughout the century – Immanuel Kant did not think highly of the balance of power as a mechanism of peace. Balance of power is like ‘Swift’s house, whose architect built it so perfectly in accord with all the laws of equilibrium that as soon as a sparrow lit on it, it fell in’ (Kant 1983/1793: 89). However, in his ‘Perpetual Peace’ essay, written in Königsberg, the capital city of East Prussia, and published during the French revolutionary wars in 1795, Kant posited interdependence through free trade, and the related civilising effect of commerce, as one of the three mechanisms of peace, alongside the republican constitution of states and prohibition to finance wars by means of state debt.

After the Napoleonic wars, reformist liberals took this idea as a key part of their blueprints for international peace. In Britain, Richard Cobden (1804-65) advocated *laissez faire* and free trade as a means to international peace, eventually becoming a celebrated statesman after years of difficulties and struggle. The theoretical basis for his advocacy came from classical political economy. The case for free trade had been put forcefully by David Ricardo in his famous work *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817). Ricardo professed the benefits of free trade in terms of comparative advantage. International division of labor can be beneficial to all parties even when there is no absolute advantage, that is, capacity to produce a particular good at a lower absolute cost than another. It is sufficient that each country has a comparative advantage. To produce a given amount of wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, and to produce the equivalent amount of cloth in the same country, might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. Even if Portugal was more (or less) efficient than Britain in producing both goods, world production could grow if countries specialised producing the good in which they possessed comparative advantage. In Ricardo’s example it was advantageous for Portugal to specialise in wine, i.e. to export wine in exchange for cloth. Ricardo (1821: 7.11) described vividly the rise of mutually beneficial interdependence especially within what he calls the “civilized world”:

Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, by regarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal

society of nations throughout the civilized world. It is this principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England.

Free trade is a universal good of the whole world, and it binds countries “together by one common tie of interest and intercourse”. It is thus natural to assume that it is also provides a firm guarantee for peace.

Does this mean that liberalism always constitutes a pacific mode of responsiveness vis-à-vis others, some of which may disagree about the benefits of free trade? Kant himself was not sure whether everyone in a league of nations should be subject to coercion should they violate the universal cosmopolitan norms, including republicanism, openness to free trade, and the implicit assumption of globally valid private property rights (see Patomäki 2002: 205-8). In practice, free trade was imposed by military means on much of Ricardo’s “non-civilized world”. India was increasingly under the command of the British East India Company, and European powers forced weaker rulers and colonies around the world to accept European exports. Enforced free trade meant de-industrialisation in places like India and Persia with proto-industrial textile and clothing production (e.g. Christian 2005: 432-7). On the other hand, free trade itself implied asymmetrical domination at least in commercial terms. A Whig member of the House of Commons explained in 1846 that free trade is a beneficent principle by which “foreign nations would become valuable colonies to us, without imposing on us the responsibility of governing them” (cited in Semmel 1970: 8).

Even Ricardo’s own example of trade between England and Portugal was ambiguous. The comparative advantage of Britain was not natural and, arguably, what happened was that “England specialised in cloth which its powerful mercantilist state supported, while Portugal specialised in wine which its weaker, agrarian state had to accept” (Peet 2007: 579). This trading pattern implied a consistent balance of payments deficit for Portugal and a surplus for Britain. Portugal had to settle the trade deficit by re-exporting £25 million worth of gold and diamonds it extracted, with not a little force, from its colony Brazil (see also Sheppard 2007). In the short run, exchange is voluntary and may seem to benefit both parties, but in the longer run, what matters is who specialises in producing what.

During the 1840s and 1850s, the British state (subsequently with France and the US) was pushing China to open up for free trade, including of opium. The British used their naval superiority and the weakness of the Qing Dynasty to push for concessions. However, after the infamous Arrow incident in 1856-7, which resulted in an English admiral destroying the Chinese river forts, burning 23 ships belonging to the Chinese navy and bombarding the city of Canton, the then already famous liberal peace activist and Member of Parliament Cobden became convinced that the British actions were utterly unrighteous. For Cobden, the civilising effect of commerce was an ideal that was meant to regulate practices, not only to justify and legitimise them. He brought forward a motion in Parliament to condemn British actions. The subsequent victory in a heated debate and vote in the Parliament cost him his seat in the next elections (at the time, franchise remained restricted to the wealthy and privileged men). However, soon

Cobden played a key role in a series of commercial treaties which brought Europe closer to a common market than at any time before perhaps the 1990s (Howe 2004). Later in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, after the turn to neo-imperialism in the 1870s and 1880s, American Admiral A.T. Mahan stressed the importance of the navy securing trade routes and private property rights for those engaged in free trade; “if navies, as all agree, exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource” (Mahan 2008/1898: 74; for a discussion see Klein 1994: 86-9). Mahan also argued that states can never be mere passive observers of changing trade patterns:

By whatever causes produced, where such a centre of commerce exists, there always will be found a point of general interest to mankind,—to all, at least, of those peoples who, whether directly commercial or not, share in the wide-spreading benefits and inconveniences arising from the fluctuations of trade. But enterprising commercial countries are not content to be mere passive recipients of these diverse influences (Mahan 2008: 42).

The consequences of free trade for peace and war were thus subject to debates in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, even within the broadly liberalist school of thought. Free trade was argued to have a civilising and pacifying effect via producing a universal common good; but in practice free trade was often enforced and sustained by imperial projections of state power.

### **3. Challenges to liberalism 1: National Political Economy**

While free trade and European imperialism led to the decline of proto-industrial production in Persia, India, China and elsewhere; some European states, English-speaking (former) colonies, and Japan quickly started to adopt and also develop new technologies and industries. Friedrich List (1789-1846) exemplifies the 19<sup>th</sup> century movement towards the idea of state-led industrial development. List was a civil servant, and then appointed briefly as a professor of administration and politics, in Württemberg. Soon he faced repression and a prison sentence and hence he emigrated to the US where he resided from 1825 to 1832, first engaging in farming and afterwards in journalism. It was in the US that he found inspiration in Alexander Hamilton’s work and became a political economist, while retaining a strong interest in history and political theory.

The national economic plan of Henry Clay, an important early 19<sup>th</sup> century politician, called ‘The American System’ was rooted in Alexander Hamilton’s American School. It was designed to enable the development of the American manufacturing sector, largely centered on the eastern seaboard, to compete with British manufacturing (the US was at war with Britain in 1812, yet after the war British factories were overwhelming American ports with inexpensive goods). With these ideas and influences, List returned to Germany as the US consul at Leipzig in 1832. He strongly advocated the extension of the railway system in Germany. It is often claimed that the establishment of the Zollverein (customs union), economically unifying Germany, was partly due to his enthusiasm and advocacy. In 1841 List was offered the post of Editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, a new liberal paper which was being established in Cologne. However,

apparent ill-health prevented him from accepting the post – which eventually went to Karl Marx.

Like his US predecessors, List reacted critically to the unique power and economic position of industrialised Britain, which also constituted a potential military threat. He protested against the cosmopolitan principles of classical liberalism and the absolute doctrine of free trade. In his principal work *The National System of Political Economy*, List (1885[1841]) (I am citing a freely downloadable copy of the 1885 English translation of List's main work, which is divided into four books and 36 chapters. In the following, I refer to this text by first mentioning the book, second the chapter and thirdly the page-number of the book in question, as shown in the A4 print-out of the text.), insisted on the special requirements of each nation according to its circumstances and especially to the degree of its development, and he famously doubted the sincerity of calls to free trade from developed nations, Britain in particular. He argued that the purpose of the 'cosmopolitical' principles of free trade that Adam Smith and other liberals advocated was 'to conceal the true policy of England [...] in order to induce foreign nations not to imitate that policy':

Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth (Ibid.: fourth book, ch.33: 2).

List was a republican thinker who developed ideas about freedom, democracy and prosperity of citizens in the modern context of industrialisation. Since the rise of Renaissance Italian city-states, 'freedom and industry [have been] inseparable companions'. Italian city-states were weak, however, strained by internal struggles and the 'lack of national union and the power which springs from it' (Ibid.: first book, ch.1: 1-2). They were thus vulnerable to the intervention by, and also domination of, other states. It was this weakness that ultimately inhibited their further development and also led to the widespread corruption of the self-serving elites. On the basis of his understanding of the historical lessons of modern Europe, List concluded that only political communities with sufficiently large scale could survive and prosper. City-states were too small, while the cosmopolitan principles of liberalism – although not totally untrue – tended to mask the interests of the most advanced nations and states. Thus List maintained that the appropriate scale would be provided by the nation-state; and advocated German unification.

List was also arguing for a long-term perspective and systematic economic planning. Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' was neither generalisable nor did it describe accurately the actual practices of the British state. According to List, it is regularly the case that the already existing private interests of the separate members of the community would not lead to the highest good of the whole. Even in the case of Britain, the landed aristocracy expressed such interests in introducing the Corn Laws that served only their short-term

interests, rather than the interests of the industrialising Britain as a whole. The protectionist Corn Laws in fact induced perceptions of injustice and attempts by the Continental countries to seek methods of establishing a manufacturing power of their own (ibid.: fourth book, ch.33, 4).

For List, wealth consists not in the quantity of actual exchange values which it already possesses, but in the long-term development of its productive powers. Thus statesmen should be prepared to take the long view, despite the need to deal also with matters of immediate urgency, and bring into existence through legislative and administrative action the conditions required for the industrial progress of the nation. This meant, among other things, protective tariffs in the early phases of industrialisation; active engagement and public investments in the physical infrastructure (canals, railways, commercial fleet, navy); focussed attempts to improve the general level of education and other prerequisites of scientific research and technological development within the country; and active colonialism following the model of the British in India (i.e. creating a core-periphery pattern of trade).

List was not against international trade or division of labour; he also advocated colonialism. Britain provided the model of modernisation and development for List too. Yet List argued that *laissez faire* and free trade were not the appropriate means to get there. It is easy to see how the principles of Listian national economics could lead to a conflict with those who profess the Ricardian idea of *laissez faire* free trade as a civilizing force and universal good of the whole world. On the other hand, once the industrial production of Germany and the US had started to catch up with Britain in the 1870s, the British state turned towards neo-imperial rhetoric and solutions for its economic problems (it took some twenty years before the new imperial rhetoric was translated into a system of imperial preferences; see Patomäki 2008: chapter 4).

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Nordahl, R. (1987) "Marx and Utopia: A Critique of the 'Orthodox' View". *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, (20):4, pp.755-83. [The purpose of this article is to refute certain aspects of the "orthodox" interpretation of Marx's utopia, maintaining that Marx allowed for conflicts and politics in his ideal society.]

Ohlin, B. (1952 / 1933) *Interregional and International Trade*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard economic studies (vol 39). [This is the book where the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade was formulated. Although Ohlin wrote the book alone, Heckscher was credited as co-developer of the model, because of his earlier work on the problem, and because many of the ideas in the final model came from Ohlin's PhD-thesis, supervised by Heckscher.]

Patomäki, H. (2002) *After International Relations. Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics*. London: Routledge. [This book tries to show how and why theories based on the international problematic have failed; articulates an alternative, critical realist research programme; and illustrates how this research programme can be put to work to enable better research and ethico-political practices on world politics and global political economy.]

Patomäki, H. (2006) "Global Justice: A Democratic Perspective". *Globalizations*, (3):2, pp. 99-120. [This paper discusses the global ethico-political implications of the theses that although the abstract concept of justice is universal, the notion of justice is constructed metaphorically, and that various theories and ideologies of justice articulate a carefully organized story of justice comprising a selected set of (largely) mutually consistent models].

Patomäki, H. (2008) *The Political Economy of Global Security. War, Future Crises and Changes in Global Governance*. London: Routledge. [This is a study of the conditions of and possibilities for global security in the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, grounded in a partial analogy to the 1870-1914 era; explanation of World War I; and analysis of the causes and consequences of neoliberalisation in the post-Bretton Woods era.]

Patomäki, H. (2010) "What Next? An Explanation of the 2008-9 Slump and Two Scenarios of the Shape of Things to Come", forthcoming in *Globalizations*, (7):1, February/March 2010. [Here a causal explanation of the 2008-9 provides the basis for two scenarios involving a likely crash in the late 2010s; the end of the era of neoliberalism by 2030; and the possibility of the emergence of green global-Keynesian policies and institutions.]

Peet, R. (2007) "Deconstructing Free Trade: From Epistemic Communities to Ideological Communities in Struggle". *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, (32):4, pp. 576-80. [This is a commentary

on Eric Sheppard's article, stressing the ideological nature of the free trade doctrine and claiming that free trade theory, based in the notion of comparative advantage, has been wrong from the beginning.]

Rawls, J. (1973) *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [The book responsible for the revival of normative political theory in the 1970s, developing a Kantian theory of justice, advocating equal fair opportunities and greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society, fit with widely shared social-democratic background understandings.]

Ricardo, D. (1821) *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. 3rd ed., London: John Murray, available at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html>. [Ricardo's most famous work, articulating his version of the labour theory of value; developing the thesis that that population growth and economic development would lead to the increase in land rent; and outlining the theory of comparative advantage, among other things.]

Richardson, Lewis F. (1960) *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of the War*. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood. [The research for this posthumously published book was done in the second half of the 1930s; together with Richardson's statistical data-analysis, it pioneered the mathematical-quantitative analysis of conflict and war.]

Schumpeter, J. (1989 / 1951) *Imperialism and Social Classes*, trans. H.Norden, P.Sweezy (ed.), New York: Kelley. [In his essay on imperialism, Schumpeter was both reacting to the neo-Marxist theories of Otto Bauer and Rudolf Hilferding and trying to explain the 1914-18 war, laying the blame on the recurring pre-capitalist structures rather than on industrial capitalism itself.]

Semmel, B. (1970) *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [This book seeks to uncover some of the intellectual origins of the 19<sup>th</sup> century imperialism in terms of free trade theory, but from a standpoint of a historian rather than an economist.]

Sheppard, E. (2007) "Response to Richard Peet". *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*. (32):4, pp. 581-2. [This is a response to Peet's commentary, clarifying several agreements on the nature and role of free trade theory, but stressing the spatiality of knowledge production.]

Smith, A. (1910 / 1776) *The Wealth of Nations*, Everyman's Library: London. [In this complex and historically oriented work, Smith explores, firstly, the origins and consequences of division of labour, money, prices, wages, profits, rent, and productivity; studies, secondly, the rise and fall of cities and nations; argues, thirdly, for something akin to free trade, in which context he invents, just in passing, the famous "invisible hand" metaphor; and finally discusses colonialism, taxes, public debt and wars.]

Swedberg, R. (1986) "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank". *Journal of Peace Research*, (23):4, pp. 377-90. [This article argues that the doctrine of economic neutrality constitutes the main ideology of the IMF and World Bank, providing a smokescreen for powerful Western nations to intervene in favour of free trade capitalism in the domestic politics of Third World countries.]

Teivainen, T. (2002) *Enter Economism, Exit Politics. Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy*. London: Zed Books. [This book explores this redefinition of the boundaries of the economic and the political spheres, and especially the tendency for the political sphere to shrink, drawing on the example of the Latin American debt crisis and, in particular, Peru.]

Tilman, R. (1972) "Veblen's Ideal Political Economy and Its Critics". *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, (31):3, pp. 307-317. [This is not only a concise summary of Veblen's normative ideals but attempt to show the errors of some of Veblen's critics – for instance that Veblen was not an elitist.]

Triffin, R. (1961) *Gold and the Dollar Crisis*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [This book warned of serious flaws in the Bretton Woods system, identifying the problem that came to be known as the Triffin dilemma.]

Triffin, R. (1968) *Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*. New York: Random House. [Another influential book by Triffin, dealing with the global monetary system and involving a detailed discussion of various reform proposals.]

Veblen, T. (1933 / 1919) *The Vested Interests and the Common Man*. New York: The Viking Press. [This book discusses various financial transformations within the historical unfolding of capitalism as well as the nature of free enterprise in general, arguing that industrialisation means also the loss of direct human relations, which in turn has manifold social consequences.]

Wæver, O. (2004) "Peace and Security. Two Concepts and Their Relationship". In S.Guzzini and D.Jung (eds.): *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.53-65. [The proponent of the theory of securitisation analyses the closely related concepts of peace and security especially in terms of their conceptual history, arguing that 'peace' has become apologetic while 'security' is potentially the name of a radical, subversive agenda.]

### **Biographical Sketch**

**Heikki Patomäki**, born in 1963, got his PhD in International Relations from the University of Turku in 1993. He has been a Reader and Professor of World Politics and Economy at the Nottingham Trent University, UK (1998-2003); Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki, Finland (2003-, currently on leave); and Innovation Professor of Human Security - Globalization and Global Institutions at the RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia (2007-). He is also the Vice Director of the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research, funded by the Academy of Finland. Patomäki's research interests include philosophy and methodology of social sciences, peace research, global political economy, global futures, and the political theory of global justice and democracy.